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MULTIPLE LOGS ANALYSIS FOR DETECTING
ZERO-DAY BACKDOOR TROJANS

SINCHAI CARAVUT

ABSTRACT

Trojan horses commonly known as “Trojans” are the computer threats that have
been recently causing trouble on the internet because of their new propagation
techniques. Social engineering has become a popular strategy to deceive people to run the
attacker’s malicious programs. Trojans use this technique to propagate themselves from a
computer or a network to others, thus making them hard to prevent. The only way to keep
computers and networks safe from them is by detecting them as soon as possible.
Because of their quiet behavior, it’s hard to detect by only IDS (Intrusion Detection
System) log analysis; therefore, multiple log analysis is presented for detecting zero-day
Trojans. Since there are many kinds of Trojans nowadays, for the first phase we will only
concentrate on zero-day backdoor Trojans.
Basically, IDS logs, connection logs, process activity logs and system logs are
considered for monitoring user activities and traffic behavior. We make the list of process
activities from studying the behavior of many kinds of backdoor Trojans. For example,
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most backdoor Trojans are downloaded from suspicious websites, which can be revealed
from IDS logs and connection logs. Next, process activity logs and system logs can
monitor applications’ behavior when users try to install backdoor Trojans such as
opening unusual ports, hiding processes, modifying the registry for auto-startup, or
disabling antivirus services. We look closer at IDS logs if infected machines try to
connect to remote IRC servers for sending information every time they start or close or if
they generate anomalous traffic such as port scanning or DDos (Distributed Denial of
Service) used to attack neighbors. Because of thorough examination, multiple log
analysis can create a powerful and accurate alarm for detecting zero-day backdoor
Trojans.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A Trojan horse or Trojan is a program that behaves like a normal program but,
behind the scenes, it runs some malicious work. There are many types of Trojans, all of
which have differences in behavior and level of severity. One of the most dangerous
types of Trojans is the backdoor Trojan because compromised machines will be fully
controlled by attackers as if they are administrators of those machines. Moreover, it can
raise other harmful activities to neighbors such as unauthorized access, DDoS, and
network scanning. When a backdoor Trojan is installed on a machine, it uses some
technique to hide itself and opens communication port(s) for attackers who want to
remotely access the machine at that time or later.
Trojans have been a danger for a long time and are still present in the Internet
world [1]. Social engineering is a popular approach to propagate them on people [1].
Attackers send a backdoor Trojan or a malicious URL to peoples’ mailboxes and disguise
it as an interesting thing from someone who can be trusted. Once the targeted people run
that Trojan or open the given URL, a Trojan will be installed on their machines silently.
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Because of this stealthy process, it’s a difficult task for administrators to prevent and
detect Trojans by only intrusion detection system (IDS) especially zero-day Trojans—
Trojans unknown to the public. It implicitly means we don’t have their signatures, so
signature-based IDS cannot recognize them. Even though we already have anomalybased IDS, which can detect malicious programs without using signature matching, this
kind of IDS highly generates false positive alarms since the nature of network traffic and
exploiting traffic are always changed.
In this paper, I present a new approach to detect zero-day backdoor Trojans by
using a Multiple Logs Analysis System (MLAS). MLAS considers IDS logs, connection
logs, process activity logs, system logs and more for monitoring activities of processes
and data traffic generated by these processes. I set the list of process activities for
comparing detected activities with backdoor Trojans and give weight for each of them.
The list of process activities is set from investigating many backdoor Trojans’ behavior
such as opening unusual ports, hiding processes and modifying registries. For example,
when users access or download software from suspicious websites, the activities are
logged into a connection log. Then MLAS checks those websites with online link
scanners to see if they are malicious. Further, MLAS looks into machine logs—
Windows event log and process activity log-- to find out what processes try to kill
antivirus program or other system monitor tools and to detect more as mentioned in the
list of process activities. Finally, MLAS look at the network intrusion detection system’s
logs to check data traffic inside the network. It tries to detect any exploit generated by
infected machines
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works and tools,
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which are used in this work. More information about the Trojan horse is covered in
section 3 including backdoor Trojan characteristics. Section 4 introduces MLAS
architecture. The list of process activities, weight and event score are specified in section
5. For the next section, MLAS application design and process flow will be technically
explained. Implementation, experimental results and result analysis are reported in
section 7. Finally, in section 8, we summarize this paper and discuss further work.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORKS AND TOOLS

LinkScanner Pro [2] is a product of Exploit Prevention Labs, which can analyze
the website content and the embedded application behavior of given IP addresses or
domain names. It checks not only inside the website but also URLs, to which the page
can connect. LinkScanner Pro detects the malicious content, exploit software, social
engineer or phishing with an up-to-date malware-definition database. It classifies
websites into four categories. Each of them indicate the level of severity. MLAS uses
these levels to score an activity in the weighting process.
McAfee SiteAdvisor [3] is another link-check application, which contains the
same functionalities as LinkScanner. This application builds an automated robot system
to check whether websites contain malicious software, social engineer, phishing or a bad
history. This information will be kept in its database and the application will rank them
into 3 levels of harmfulness. MLAS converts these levels into a score of an activity. The
reasons that MLAS uses more than one link scanner are to assure the information about
the severity of website and to have a big malware-definition database.
4

Snort [4] is a widely used signature-based IDS, which can detect many attacks
using pattern matching. It monitors all data traffic passed through a network and
compares traffic behavior with signatures. If any traffic behavior matches with any
signature inside a signature-definition database, it will generate alarms to administrators.
MLAS get information from the alarms and send them into behavior detection processes
for comparing process activities and scoring process activities.
Project Lasso [5] is a Windows event log collector. It converts the event log from
binary format to text format and sends it across a network via syslog-ng protocol (TCP)
to a syslog server. In MLAS, we use only a feature of converting the event log to txt
format. This log data will be sent to a database via the MLAS log management system.
Project Lasso is an open source application developed by LogLogic Inc.
Port Reporter [11] is an application used to record all connections created by
processes on a local machine. The log file contains remote IPs, remote ports, local IPs,
local ports and process names, which make a connection. This information is useful for
the Behavior Comparing System to compare traffic activities if it meets one in the list of
process activities. Also, the remote IPs are sent to the Link Check System for examining
the dangers of remote servers.
Sophos Anti-Rootkit [12] is a rootkit scanner. It can detect and clean up hidden
processes, hidden registries and hidden files in machines. Some Trojans use rootkit
techniques to conceal themselves and Windows cannot see them without using special
tool. Sophos Anti-Rootkit was introduced to find these hidden objects and send the object
names to MLAS. Sophos Anti-Rootkit is a freeware developed by Sophos Inc.
For a database server, MLAS uses Oracle [13] -- the popular relational database
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management system product in the market. Oracle provides thin-client JDBC for Java,
thus making it easy for Java development. Also, Snort has an interface communicating
with Oracle in order to keep log data into the database. The version we used in MLAS is
Oracle10gXE database server and client.
System safety monitor (SSM) [14] is a system monitor application. It monitors
process activities, inter-process activities, DLL injection, low level access of hardware,
etc. SSM allows user to create rules for controlling processes when they try to access
resources of other processes, or to start or to terminate processes. MLAS use this
application to detect keyloggers, DLL injection and process termination.
These powerful applications provide useful data to MLAS to detect processes run
by backdoor Trojans. Port Reporter records all connections created by processes on a
local machine and sends remote IPs to LinkScanner Pro and McAfee SiteAdvisor to
check their content. Any anomalous network traffic will be captured by Snort. All
process activities can be found in Lasso logs and System Safety Monitor logs. For hidden
objects, MLAS uses Sophos Anti-Rootkit to find them. Log data and results are kept in
an Oracle database. For the next section, I will discuss how processes work together and
what the architecture of MLAS is.
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CHAPTER III
THE TROJAN HORSE

The word “Trojan horse” came from the story of the Trojan War. The war
happened when the Greeks wanted to penetrate through the walls of Troy, which had
been surrounded by many troops. The Greeks made a huge horse as a sign of
peacefulness and gave this gift to Troy, but inside the horse, there were many Greek
troops waiting to attack Troy. Troy accepted the gift and brought it into the city. After the
city celebrated their peacefulness and became drunk, the Greek troops inside the horse
went outside and opened the gate allowing other troops to take over the city [16].
In the computer security term, we use the name of the Trojan horse to name the
malicious programs, which have characteristics like the Greeks’ horse. The Trojan is a
malicious application, which pretends to be a legitimate application. When users install
the Trojan, the hidden code will be installed as well. The backdoor Trojan is a kind of
Trojans but it has some different characteristics, such as opening backdoor ports to the
system. Attackers can access the system by creating a remote connection and controlling
it to do many things (these kinds of Trojans are also called Remote Access Trojans
7

(RAT) [17]. For example, the common activities are
•

Using the system to be a mail relay and sending spam in order to propagate
themselves or something else

•

Stealing users’ identity or private information such as credit card numbers,
account numbers and SSN

•

Monitoring users’ activities

•

Attacking neighbor

•

Modifying machines’ object such as files, system registries and system log
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How do the backdoor Trojans work?
1. Attackers distribute Trojans in many ways such as spam email with an attached
backdoor Trojan program

DISTRIBUTE

ATTACKER

Figure 1 An attacker distributes Trojan emails

2. When users receive email and run the backdoor Trojan program, the Trojan will
be installed on users’ machine, open backdoor port(s) and notify attacker via IRC,
ICQ, MSN or email.

INCOMING TROJAN
EMAIL
NOTIFY

ATTACKER
Figure 2 A user receives a Trojan email, runs
the Trojan program and notifies to the attacker
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3. Attackers can remotely connect to the infected machine and control it

ATTACKER
Figure 3 An infected machine opens a backdoor port so
that the attacker can remotely connect to it to control it
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Backdoor Trojans’ characteristics and activities [6], [7], [8], [9]
1. propagates itself by
•

attaching Trojan’s executable files in spam emails.

•

sending Trojan’s executable files via Internet Relay Chat (IRC), MSN or ICQ.

•

exploiting an existing vulnerability or through an open port such as


The Microsoft SQL Server 2000 or MSDE 2000 Audit



The Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overrun
Vulnerability



The Microsoft Windows Local Security Authority Service Remote Buffer
Overflow

•

inserting its code in other files or programs.

•

enumerating all the shared drives and attempts to copy itself to the root folder
of the shares.

•

downloading code to machines when they visit malicious or compromised
web pages.

•

copying itself to the shared folders of some popular file-sharing networks such
as Kazaa, Edonkey.

2. consists of a server component and a client component.
3. sends victim’s information via SMTP mail, IRC, ICQ pager, ICP Pager, Yahoo
Messenger, AOL Instant Messenger, MSN Messenger, and a remote PHP page.
4. contains its own SMTP engine for constructing outgoing messages.
5. injects a companion backdoor dll into a system dll/exe process space such as
csrss.exe, svchost.exe, iexplore.exe. This can avoid personal firewall detection.
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6. launches the Internet Explorer process and attempt to access malicious web sites
7. hides Trojan’s files and services using a rootkit.
8. hides or unhide files, directories, keys, service names, or process names.
9. sets the file attributes of the dropped files to SHR: System, Hidden and Read only.
10. performs DoS attack.
11. uses the XCP software to hide the copy of the Trojan files and the created registry
subkeys.
12. attempts to add the Trojan application as a trusted application into the firewall
authorized application list or the Windows Firewall.
13. connects to IRC servers to wait commands.
14. normally distributes as a Win32 PE exe dropper that may be disguised as a JPG or
BMP picture.
15. attempts to obtain access to the password cache.
16. a Trojan server process on victim machine make the connection to the client on
port 80 using HTTP. In this way, it attempts to avoid personal firewall detection.
17. attempts to SPAM others by searching for email addresses in the Windows
Address Book, Internet Explorer's cache folder, and the %Temp% folder in order
to spread the Trojan through email.
18. creates a registry run key to load the Trojan processes at Windows startup.
19. kills running processes such as Remote Access Connection Manager, Remote
Procedure Call, Remote Procedure Call Service, DCOM.
20. kills or disables firewall, antivirus programs, the windows update service and
system monitoring tools.
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21. decreases the security level.
22. appends the local hosts file (in an attempt to disable updating of many AV
products). For example,
127.0.0.1 www.trendmicro.com
127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com
23. logs pressed keys when users type.
24. captures browser window titles and keystrokes typed into Windows with the
following strings such as bank, cash, login.
25. clears CMOS.
26. views the screen.
27. causes Windows to shut down/reboot/log user off.
28. opens unusual/unexpected ports on machine.
29. manages the local file system.
30. runs system commands via CMD.EXE (command is passed in via HTML form).
31. inserts a script into HTML files on servers to give an individual with unauthorized
full access to CMD.EXE.
32. floods others to make networks slow down such as HTTP, ICMP, SYN, Ping, and
UDP floods.
33. redirects attempts to access spoofed web pages.
34. adds new accounts.
35. serves as a HTTP proxy or an SMTP relay.
36. attempts to delete files generated by Trojans.
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37. The following registry entry is added to install a BHO (Browser Helper Object)
for generating extra pop-up ads, monitoring page navigation explorer
38. turns on the victim's Webcam.
39. adds configurable entry to the "load=" and "run=" lines in Win.ini, and "shell="
line of System.ini.
40. schedules tasks to run Trojan’s processes.
41. monitors the Internet Explorer for data submitted in web forms and log this
information.

14

CHAPTER IV
THE MLAS ARCHITECTURE

The MLAS Architecture

Log
files

Log
Management
System

URLs

Link
Check
System

Link
score

Log
data

Weighting
System

Weighting
result
Behavior
Detection
System

Connection info,
System info,
Process into,
etc.

Behavior
score

Report
Generation
System

Multiple Logs Analysis System: MLAS

Figure 4 MLAS architecture
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Report
files

Log Management System (LMS)

Log
files

Log File
Parsing
Engine

Log file
pattern

Log
data

Data
Storing
Engine

Log Management System

Figure 5 Log Management System

The LMS manages log files received from many applications. The Log File
Parsing Engine parses log files following a log file pattern. Then, the Data Storing Engine
keeps this data in the database.
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Link Check System (LCS)

URLs/
Remote IPs

Data
Retrieving
Engine

Link
Check
Engine

HTTP
requests
HTTP
responses

Score
Assignment
Engine

Data
Storing
Engine

Link
score

Link Check System

Figure 6 Link Check System

The LCS checks URLs that user on target machine visited with link scanner
agents outside MLAS. The Data Retrieving Engine retrieves URLs or remote IPs in the
database. The Link Check Engine sends HTTP requests with parameter URLs to link
scanner agents in order to check the level of harmfulness. When it receives responses, it
sends this result to the Score Assignment Engine to assign score for each of URLs.
Assigned scores will be stored in the database to be an input of the Weighting System.
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Behavior Detection System (BDS)

Connection info,
System info,
Process into,
etc.
The list of
process
activities

Data
Retrieving
Engine

Behavior
Comparison
Engine

Score
Assignment
Engine

Data
Storing
Engine

Behavior
score

Behavior Detection System

Figure 7 Behavior Detection System

The BDS detects behavior of processes, which run on the target machine, to
match with process activities in the list. Connection logs, system logs, process activity
logs and others are retrieved by the Data Retrieving Engine. The Behavior Comparison
Engine compares this information with process activities in the list and scores for each of
the activities. Then, it sends the result to the Weighting System. The scores of the
activities are assigned by the Score Assignment Engine. Results from this system will be
stored in the database.
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Weighting System (WS)

Link score,
Behavior score

Minimum
weight

Data
Retrieving
Engine

Weighting
Engine

Data
Storing
Engine

Weighting
result

Weighting System

Figure 8 Weighting System

The WS makes the decision whether activities generated from the target machine
are suspicious in that they might be infected by backdoor Trojans. The Weighting Engine
receives the score from LCS and BDS and calculates weight of these data. If the total
weight is more than the minimum weight that we set from experiments in the laboratory,
MLAS assumes this machine is suspicious in that it might be infected by a backdoor
Trojan; otherwise, it is not suspicious. Information about a suspicious machine is sent to
the Report Generation System.
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Report Generation System (RGS)

Data
Retrieving
Engine

Weighting
result

Report
Generation
Engine

Report
Delivery
Engine

Report
files

Report Generation System

Figure 9 Report Generation System

The RGS generates reports to administrators. The Report Generation Engine
receives information from WS and creates reports. The reports contain the total weight of
every process run on the target machine and detail of process activities, which are met
with process activities in the list. These reports will be sent to administrators by the
Report Delivery Engine.
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CHAPTER V
PROCESS ACTIVITIES, WEIGHT AND EVENT SCORE

Process activities and weight
From the backdoor Trojans’ characteristics and activities, I chose the important
events to create the list of process activities. Each process activity was assigned weight
by level of severity, which can harm a system or a network. The first time, I assigned
weight following an assumption on how dangerous these process activities can be. After
many testing, the weight of some process activities was changed as mentioned in the
result analysis (chapter VII). Finally, the process activities and their weight ended up
following the table process activities and weight.
The weights ranged from 1 to 3. The higher value is the higher level of severity.
Table I Weight and meaning

Weight
1
2
3

Meaning
a general activity that is a part of backdoor behavior.
a general activity that is a part of backdoor behavior and can generate
serious situations to machines.
a backdoor Trojan behavior.
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Score
A score will be assigned to measure how close a detected event matches to a
process activity in the list. The range of score is from 0 to 10. The maximum score value
determines that the detected event is very close to the process activity in the list. Events
that have the score 0 will be ignored and not be recoded.
Table II Process activities and weight

1

Event
An application saves its files into %WinDir% or %SysDir% rather
than %Program Files%

2

Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application adds its process into registry in part of automatic
startup to run itself every time Windows start or copies the process
into startup folder

3

4

5

More detail:
[Appendix A: 1. Startup registry keys and startup folder]
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application tries to change the configuration of Windows
monitor tools or a Windows update component in the registry.
More detail:
[Appendix A: 2. Windows monitor tools’ configuration registry
keys]
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application add some value into this registry to generate extra
pop-up ads or monitor the navigation explorer page:
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win
dows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects
More Detail:
[appendix A: 3. Browser Helper Object]
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application tries to send machine’s information via SMTP
mail, IRC, ICQ pager, ICP Pager, Yahoo Messenger, AOL Instant
Messenger, MSN Messenger, and a remote PHP page.
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Weight
2

1

2

2

2

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

More Detail:
[appendix A: 4. Ports and login servers for sending machine’s
information]
Detection:
The Port reporter application’s log
Snort’s log
An application tries to inject DLLs into system DLLs/processes,
such as csrss.exe, svchost.exe, iexplore.exe
More Detail:
[appendix A: 5. DLL injection]
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application attempts to access malicious web sites while it’s
installing or after installing
Detection:
The Port reporter application’s log
An application hides its files, directories, service names, or
process names using rootkit
More Detail:
[appendix A: 6. Rootkit]
Detection :
The Sophos Anti-Rootkit application’s log
An application performs attacks to neighbors such as DoS attack,
protocol floods, port scan.
Detection:
Snort’s log
An application connects to an IRC server for waiting command
from an attacker.
Detection:
The Port reporter application’s log
An application attempts to access the password cache or any
location where password information is contained.
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application creates SMTP connection and sends many emails
in order to spread itself through spam emails by searching for
email addresses in Outlook’s Address Book.
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2

3

2

3

3

3

3

13

Detection :
Windows Event Log-> security log
The Port reporter application’s log
An application tries to kill running system processes such as
Remote Access Connection Manager, Remote Procedure Call,
Remote Procedure Call Service, DCOM

2

14

Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application kills or disables system monitoring tools such as
the Windows firewall, the Windows update service and antivirus
programs, or it decreases the security level of that machine.

3

15

Detection :
The System safety monitor’s log
An application appends the local hosts file with any security
websites to loop to a localhost ip. For example, it appends this line
“127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com”

2

16

Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application logs keystrokes that a user typed into Windows.

3

17

More Detail:
[appendix A: 7. Keylogger]
Detection :
System safety monitor’s log
An application captures the screen

2

18

Detection :
An application opens unusual/unexpected ports on the machine.

2

More detail:
Considering ports as unusual ports is upon environment of a
network. For example, in a web server farm network, port number
80 is a usual port. On the other hand, this port can be considered
as an unusual port if it appears in a user network group.
In this work, MLAS will be implemented on a user network
group, so server ports such as http, ftp, SMTP, etc. will be
considered as unusual ports.
Detection :
Windows Event log ->security log
The Port Reporter’s log
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19

20

21

22

An application adds new accounts.
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application serves as a server such as an HTTP proxy or a
SMTP relay.
Detection:
Windows Event log>security log
An application adds entries to
• the file Win.ini in the lines containing keywords "load="
and "run="
• the file System.ini in the lines containing a keyword
"shell="
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
An application reads Windows system’s information
Detection :
Windows Event Log> security log
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3

3

2

1

CHAPTER VI
MLAS APPLICATION DESIGN

Log file format
Event report
File name format
MLAS_EVENT_REPORT[date].HTM
Report format
[IP1]
[detected event1]
[event1 detail]
[detected event2]
[event2 detail]
[more events]
[IP2]
[detected event1]
[event1 detail]
[detected event2]
[event2 detail]
[more events]
[more IPs]
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Summary Report
File name format
MLAS_SUMMARY_REPORT[date].HTM
Report format
[IP1]
[process1]
[process1’s total weight]
[process2]
[process2’s total weight]
[more processes]
[IP2]
[process1]
[process1’s total weight]
[process2]
[process2’s total weight]
[more processes]
[more IPs]
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Process flow

Figure 10 Process flow of LinkCheckEngine, WeightingEngine, and LogFileParsingEngine
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BehaviorComparingEngine

Compare detected events
with criteria

List monitored
machines
Set constrains to
be checked
Compare detected
events with criteria
(regarding to the
machine’s IP)
Compare the
constrains with
detected events
List processes
created in the
detecting period
Match?
Compare detected
events with criteria
(regarding to the
process name)

yes

Assign score &
log the events

Figure 11 Process flow of BehaviorComparingEngine
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ReportGenerationEngine

EventReport

SummaryReport

Call EventReport

List monitored
machines

List monitored
machines
Call
SummaryReport

List all detected
criteria

List process name

Generate event
report

Call
WeightingEngine

Generate
summary report

Figure 12 Process flow of ReportGenerationEngine
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Database schema
Table III TABLE_AND_LOG_FILE_MAPPING
Column Name
Data Type
Nullable
Primary Key
TABLE_NAME

VARCHAR2(100)

No

1

FILE_NAME

VARCHAR2(1000)

No

2

SEPARATOR

VARCHAR2(100)

No

-

BEGIN_AT_LINE

NUMBER

No

-

DATE_FORMAT

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

Column Name

Table IV TABLE_SCHEMA
Data Type
Nullable

Primary Key

TABLE_NAME

VARCHAR2(1000)

No

1

ATTRIBUTE_NAME

VARCHAR2(1000)

No

2

ATTRIBUTE_ORDER

NUMBER

No

-

ATTRIBUTE_TYPE

VARCHAR2(1000)

No

-

Column Name

Table V EVENT_LOG
Data Type
Nullable

Primary Key

ID

NUMBER

No

1

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

2

LOG_TYPE

VARCHAR2(100)

No

-

LOG_TIME

DATE

No

-

EVENT_ID

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

USER_NAME

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

GROUP_NAME

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

EVENT_TYPE

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

DESCRIPTION

VARCHAR2(1000)

Yes

-

31

Table VI TRAFFIC_LOG
Data Type
Nullable

Column Name

Primary Key

ID

NUMBER

No

1

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

2

LOG_TIME

DATE

No

-

PROTOCAL

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

LOCAL_PORT

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

LOCAL_IP

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

REMOTE_PORT

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

REMOTE_IP

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

PID

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

PROCESS_NAME

VARCHAR2(100)

Yes

-

USER_NAME

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

Table VII ROOTKIT_REPORT
Data Type
Nullable

Column Name

Primary Key

ID

NUMBER

No

1

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

2

REPORT_TIME

DATE

No

-

HIDDEN_OBJECT_TYPE

VARCHAR2(100)

No

-

HIDDEN_OBJECT_NAME

VARCHAR2(600)

No

-

Table VIII DETECTING_LOG
Data Type
Nullable

Column Name

Primary Key

ID

NUMBER

No

1

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

2

DETECTING_TIME

DATE

Yes

-

PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

SCORE

NUMBER

Yes

-

FROM_LOG_TABLE

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

FROM_LOG_ID

NUMBER

Yes

-

PROCESS_NAME

VARCHAR2(1000)

Yes

-

Column Name
PORT_NUMBER

Column Name
SERVICE_NAME

Table IX BLACK_PORT_NUMBER
Data Type
Nullable
VARCHAR2(50)

No

Primary Key
1

Table X MONITORING_SERVICE_NAME
Data Type
Nullable
Primary Key
VARCHAR2(500)
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No

1

Table XI BLACK_PORT_NUMBER
Data Type
Nullable

Column Name
PORT_NUMBER

Col umn Name

VARCHAR2(50)

No

Primary Key
1

Table XII APPLICATION_PARAMETER
Data Type
Nul lable
Primary Key

PARAMETER_NAME

VARCHAR2(4000)

No

1

DETECTING_PERIOD

NUMBER

No

-

ENABLE

NUMBER

Yes

-

Table XIII DLL_INJECTION_LOG
Column Name

Data Type

Nul lable

Primary Key

ID

NUMBER

No

1

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

2

LOG_TIME

DATE

Yes

-

EVENT_TYPE

VARCHAR2(10)

Yes

-

EVENT_ACTION

VARCHAR2(10)

Yes

-

USER_NAME

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

PARENT

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

CHILD

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

RESULT

VARCHAR2(500)

Yes

-

Column Name

Table XIV IP_LIST
Data Type
Nul lable

Primary Key

IP

VARCHAR2(100)

No

1

ENABLE

NUMBER

Yes

-

Table XV WEIGHT_OF_PROCESS_ACTIVITIES
Column Name
Data Type
Nul lable
Primary Key
PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME

VARCHAR2(200)

No

1

WEIGHT

NUMBER

No

-
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CHAPTER VII
IMPLEMENTATION, EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS

Limitation
This experiment is applied to Windows XP and the similar OS architecture.

Figure 13 MLAS network diagram
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Applications run on the machines
The VICTIM machine and the NEIGHBOR machine
•

Enable security audit for these objects


A system32 directory following policy: audit this folder only for creating
files



A program file directory following policy: audit this folder and sub for
creating directory



A windows directory following policy: audit this folder only for creating
files



Files hosts, system.ini, and win.ini following policy: audit this object only
for writing data

•

Run the Lasso for collecting Windows event log, which is binary data, to a
text file.

•

Run the Port Reporter for logging data traffic generated from local machine to
remote machine.

•

Run System Safety Monitor for real-time monitoring inter-process activities

•

Schedule the RootkitBuster to run everyday. It will scan a local machine to
find hidden files, hidden registry and hidden process. Then generate a log file

•

Schedule LogFileParsing, a module in LMS, to parse these log files and store
data into database. It will be run everyday.

The NW MONITOR machine
•

Install Snort (with oracle supported option) and run as NIDS. Its alerts will be
logged into the database
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The ATTACKER machine
•

Contain backdoor Trojan clients and servers for exploit the victim machine.
Below is the list of backdoor Trojans, which were tested in experiments.


Assasin 2.0 Final



Beast 2.07



CIA 1.23 Pb1



Minimo Public 0.7



ProRat V1.9



SubSeven V.2.1.5

Application configuration and testing steps
[Appendix B: Application configuration and testing steps]
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Experimental results
The Normal activities case

37

38

39

40

PROCESS ACTIVITIES-FREQUENCY in the Normal activities case

10

8

frequency
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Figure 14 Process activity-frequency graph of the normal activities case
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Figure 15 Process name-weight graph
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Results analysis
Weighting
Table XVI Process activities and weight

PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME
WEIGHT
C1SavingFileIntoSystemFolder
2
C2RegisteringAsStartupProcess
1
C3ModifyingConfigOfWindowsMonitorTools
2
C4AddingBrowserHelper
2
C5SendingInfoViaChatApp
2
C6DLLInjection
2
C7CheckLink
3
C8HiddingItself
2
C9CheckAttackingNeighbors
3
C10ConnectingIRCServer
3
C11AccessingPasswordFile
3
C12Spamming
3
C14KillingOrDisablingSystemMonitoringTools
3
C15ModifyingHostsFile
2
C16LowLevelKeyboardAccess
3
C18OpeningPort
2
C19CreatingUserAccount
3
C20ServingAsServer
3
C21ModifyingWinIni_SystemIniFile
2
C22ReadSystemInformation
1

1. From the case Normal Activities we can see C2, C3, C6 and C18 are the general
activities. We should give them less weight than others. At the first round of
analysis, we give these process activities weight 1. In case of C3, C6 and C18,
however, they can be the serious situations, which are harmful to the machine. We
increase their weight to 2.

43

2. C7, C9, C10, C12, C14, C16 and C20 are identified as backdoor behaviors. These
activities will not appear in the case Normal Activities whereas they will be
detected sometimes in later Trojan test cases, so we give them weight 3.
3. C5 should be seen in the case Normal Activities because chat applications such as
ICQ, MSN or AIM are popular programs, which many people use frequently.
This process activity is hard to be detected because chat service providers’
servers, ports or login approaches are often changed upon application version and
manual configuration of each user. In case of C8, we can detect some system
files, system processes or system registries hiding themselves in order to protect
them from innocent users who try to modify or delete them without enough
knowledge. However, both process activities are the part of backdoor Trojan
behavior. We assign their weight to 2.
4. From considering the process activities C1, C4, C11, C19 and C21, Trojans use
these activities to install and escalate themselves to get more privilege. We assign
their weight 3. However, in the case Normal Activities, these activities can be
found in some kinds of applications; for example, installing toolbars is a cause of
meeting C4, or the process “msiexec.exe”, which is used to install new programs
that use Windows Installer package files, may have to access system objects such
as Windows directory, system32 directory, win.ini and system.ini. Therefore, we
change the weight of C1, C4 and C21 to 2
5. Finally, a machine’s system information is an important thing for knowing its
platform, service pack version, host name, etc. Attackers want to know it before
they exploit a system. However, this kind of activity can be detected in normal
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applications especially in reading system information. So, we assign weight of
C22 to 1 and C15 to 2 because of lower detecting frequency

Threshold of process weight
The Normal activities case
The average of the normal process score: 820/30 = 27.3
The maximum process activities found in normal processes: 3
Top 3 process activities met in normal processes: C2, C3 and C18
The sum score of top 3 process activities: 50

The Trojan case
The average of the normal process score: 860/31 = 27.7
The maximum process activities found in normal processes: 3
Top 3 process activities met in normal processes: C1, C6 and C18
The sum weight of top 3 process activities: 60
The average of the backdoor Trojan process score: 810/6 = 135
The minimum process activities found in Trojan processes: 5
Top 5 process activities met in the backdoor Trojan processes: C1, C5, C6,
C14 and C18
The sum weight of top 5 process activities: 110
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Result
For the maximum threshold value of the normal process, I consider the top
3 process activities in the normal activities case because when I tested the
Trojan case, some of correlative processes of a Trojan process appeared and
could deviate the process weight.
Table XVII Threshold score

Score range
Below 50
51-109
Above 110

Result
A normal process
A suspect process
A backdoor Trojan process

If any machine contains a suspect process, they should be inspected closely.
They may or may not be infected with a backdoor Trojan because MLAS contains
a false positive alarm (more detail below). If any machine contains a process
having a weight over 110, they are considered a victim of backdoor Trojans. In
this case, administrators should quarantine them from the network and find the
way to end them

Null process
Some process activities cannot be determined by the process name. For
instance, attacking neighbors is detected by Snort. Because Snort doesn’t provide
information about process names, which create the attacking connection, MLAS
cannot identify the process names. In case of processes hiding themselves,
Windows event log sometimes cannot see them, so we cannot determine the
process name either.
Because the weight isn’t counted into any process name, these process
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activities can only be detected by looking at the level of the machine’s IP and.
Then, when administrators consider the threshold of process weight, we should
add this weight into the process weight as well

False positive alarm
From the result in the Normal activities case, regedit.exe, svchost.exe,
msiexec.exe and null process name were considered as false positive alarms.
Their weights were considered as suspect processes but actually this false positive
was caused by special activities made by administrators or by the machine’s
normal process behavior.
“regedit.exe” was created by administrators who wanted to check data inside
Windows registry. This kind of activity can occur anytime when administrators
notice something wrong in the system and want to check data inside the registry.
So, if there are similar activities made by authorized users, the false positive
alarm will occur and it can be ignored.
The process “svchost.exe” and “msiexec.exe” can create the false positive
alarm because of their normal process behavior. The process svchost.exe is used
to manage the local system and interoperate with other processes. Moreover, it
has to open ports for receiving requests from other machines or processes. One
solution we found for reducing a false positive alarm of this process is learning
the process behavior about the opening ports frequently and safely. MLAS
provides white-port tuning that allows administrators to tell the system what the
safe ports are. The processes can open these ports without alerting process activity
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C18.
The process msiexec.exe is a broker process used to install new programs that
use Windows Installer package files (MSI). It accesses the system object instead
of the real process. Because of this, its weight can be raised to the level of the
suspect process. When administrators found this kind of process, they should take
care of these processes separately.

Problems
1. The URL checking website, LinkScanner, has a limitation of the number of
connections. So if MLAS send many requests over its limitation, the system
will get a timeout error and have to wait until the scanner accept connections
again.
2. The process activities C8 and C22 are difficult to be detected because there
are many ways to achieve these activities. MLAS cannot cover every
approach, so from the experimental result, MLAS couldn’t detect C8 and C22.
3. Currently, there is no precise approach to detecting keyloggers. MLAS tries to
monitor accessing low level of keyboard to detect the process activities C16
even though it’s not the best way. From the experiment, MLAS can detect
these process activities in some Trojans, but not all of them.
4. The System Safety Monitor software I tried, which is used in MLAS, is a trial
version and will be expired if I don’t buy a license extension. I tried to test the
free version of this application but it didn’t provide as many features as I
needed.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

MLAS is developed in order to detect backdoor Trojans at zero day or unknown
backdoor Trojans. It uses the new technique called multiple logs analysis that analyzes
log data collected by many monitoring tools. The Project Lasso collects security audit
events and process activities from Windows Event Log. The System Safety Monitor
records inter-process activities. Communication activities are captured by the Port
Reporter and send remote IPs to LinkScanner and McAfee SiteAdvisor to check their
harmfulness. The Sophos rootkit scanner is used to detect hidden processes and hidden
files on a local machine. Also, Snort monitors traffic on a computer network and logs
abnormal connections to the Oracle database server.
MLAS can detect the Trojan processes by looking at the total weight of process.
A process having weight more than the threshold will be determined to be a Trojan
process. From the experimental results, MLAS can detect each of six Trojan processes,
which have the distinctive high process weight. Moreover, any suspect process will be
detected by MLAS using the second threshold comparison.
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MLAS can be improved to deploy on many kinds of operating systems. Because
nowadays the operating systems are varied widely, developing MLAS in the first phase is
based on Windows XP and other operating systems that have the same architecture. If
you want to deploy MLAS on other systems, it should be adapted in some of the process
activity detection approaches such as the location of system objects and monitoring tools
compatibility. Moreover, emerging of new tools can improve MLAS in case of process
activity detection. This problem can be seen in MLAS. It cannot find a tools or a way to
detect an event, which meets the process activities in the list. Or it can just detect the side
effect of the event that can create the false decision. Finally, computer security
experience in auditing systems is necessary for MLAS as well. The better auditing can
catch more events relating to process activities in the list.
The concept and framework of MLAS can be used to detect other kinds of
malware on computer systems other than zero-day backdoor Trojans. It is able to study
the malware’s behavior, create new list of process activities and find appropriate tools to
detect process activities’ event. In the future, MLAS may become to a new powerful
monitoring tool because of its effective framework and improved human knowledge.
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APPENDIX A:
1. Startup registry keys and startup folders
•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Currentcontrolset\Services
to create a Trojan process as a service.

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Run\ and
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
RunOnce
to create Trojan processes as background services when the logon dialog box
first appears, or at this stage of the boot process only once per boot.

•

KEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run
to run Trojan processes each time a new user logs in.

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
to start Trojan processes when Windows starts up.

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\
WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify
Windows will notify Trojan processes to be run when a logon event occurs.

•

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Exefile\shell\open\command
Key name: (Default)
Key value: "%1" %*
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If value of “(Default)” key is changed to {%Trojan path% /exec:"%1" %*},
The Trojan will be automatically invoked when file type “exe” is called. Trojans
can deal with other file type such as JPEG
(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Jpegfile\Shell\Open\Command
"(Default)" = %Trojan path% /exec:%interpreter%).
•

C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\ Programs\Startup
A startup folder contains processes that the user wants to run at Windows
startup.

2. Windows monitor tools’ configuration registry keys
•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Security Center
to modify configuration of a Windows security monitor tool.

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Wind
owsUpdate\auto update
to modify configuration of a Windows update service.

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\Do
mainProfile
to modify configuration of Windows Firewall application

•

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\
Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
A list of applications that can be passed through firewall.
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3. Browser Helper Object
A "Browser Helper Object (BHO)" is a DLL that works with Internet Explorer for
some special purpose. BHOs can be installed on machines for being supplement toolbars
of the Internet Explorer application. They may or may not require user interface or users’
permission for installing. So, they can reside in any machines without users’ awareness.
Trojans use this kind of DLL to monitor and gather information of users when they’re
surfing

4. Ports and login servers for sending machine’s information
Destination port
•

SMTP: TCP 25, 465

•

MSN Messenger: TCP 1863

•

Yahoo! Messenger: TCP 80

•

ICQ: UDP 2000-4000, TCP 5190

•

AOL Instant Messenger: TCP 5190

Login server
•

AOL Instant Messenger: login.oscar.aol.com:443, login.oscar.aol.com,
toc.oscar.aol.com and login.icq.com

•

MSN Messenger: gateway.messenger.hotmail.com

•

ICQ: login.icq.com and http.proxy.icq.com

•

Yahoo! Messenger: msg.edit.yahoo.com/*
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5. DLL injection
A Dynamically Linked Library (DLL) is a shared library, to which many
processes can access. DLLs provide common functions that processes don’t have to
reproduce for their own. When any processes want to use DLLs, they load the DLLs into
their virtual address space and call functions inside the loaded DLLs
DLL injection is inserting code into a program’s memory space. It can be
achieved by many approaches. The popular approach has the following steps:
•

Start a process

•

Create a DLL

•

Open a target process

•

Load the DLL into reserved virtual address space of the target process

•

Create a remote thread inside the target process to run the loaded DLL

Figure 16 A process injects a DLL into a target process and
creates a remote thread inside the target process [18]
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For malicious applications, the objective of this activity is avoiding firewall
detection. When a malicious process wants to communicate with an attacker, it creates a
remote thread in a trusted process and uses this process name to bypass the firewall.

Figure 17 A malicious process is bloceked from a firewall [19]

Figure 18 A malicious process inject a DLL into
a trusted process for bypass firewall detection [19]

6. Rootkit
Definition of a rootkit
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A rootkit is a program or set of programs that an intruder uses to hide their
presence on a computer system and to allow access to the computer system in the
future. To accomplish its goal, a rootkit will alter the execution flow of the
operating system or manipulate the data set that the operating system relies upon
for auditing and bookkeeping [20].

How does the Rootkit work?
The Rootkit processes run in a low level mode, which can intercept
applications’ call to the operating system and modify the result sent back to the
applications. For example, when an user runs the Task manager for monitor
running processes, the task manager makes a system call to the operating system
for retrieving a list of running processes. The Rootkit intercepts this system call
and delete its own process name in the list returned to the Task manager. So, the
user cannot see the Rootkit process. From this kind of activity, the Rootkit can
hide its existence such as communication ports, files and registries [21].

7. Keylogger
The Keylogger is a program used to keep track of information that a user typed in
any application and save it into a file, which is usually encrypted and hidden from the
user. It can log any important information such as credit card numbers, username and
password. It may be detected by checking low level access of keyboard of a process.
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APPENDIX B: Application configuration and testing steps
1. Application configuration
The MLAS machine
The BehaviorComparingEngine task schedule

Figure 19 BehaviorComparingEngine task schedule
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The ReportGenerationEngine task schedule

Figure 20 ReportGenerationEngine task schedule

The batch files
behaviorComparingEngineBatch.bat
cd C:\MLAS\app
java BehaviorComparingEngine > app.log

reportGenerationEngineBatch.bat
cd C:\MLAS\app
java ReportGenerationEngine

Oracle Database Server
Database Setting
Oracle Database 10g Express Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - Product
PL/SQL Release 10.2.0.1.0 - Production
CORE 10.2.0.1.0 Production
TNS for 32-bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production
NLSRTL Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production
dbname: XE
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user: sinchai
password: JfNkK852
user:snort
password: JfNkK852

The VICTIM machine and the NEIGHBOR machine
Security audit
1. Explorer>Tools>View: deselects “Use simple file sharing”

Figure 21 Use simple file sharing option
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2. [Audit Object]>Sharing and Security>Security

Figure 22 Security tab
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3. Advance>Audit

Figure 23 Audit tab

4. Add: Everyone

Figure 24 User selection window
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5. OK>selects or deselects desired events

Figure 25 Object event audit tab

6. set the configuration
Table XVIII Object audit configuration

Audited object

windows
hosts, system.ini, win.ini

Audit apply to
this folder only
this folder and
subfolders
this folder only
this object only

C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
C:\WINDOWS\repair\sam

this object only
this object only

system32
program file

65

Audited event
create file
create dir
create file
write data
append data
write attr
write atten attr
change permission
All
All

HCU\Software\Microsoft\
Protected Storage System Provider
Documents and Settings\Application Data\
Microsoft\Credentials
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\
IntelliForms\Storage2
C:\Documents and Settings\KARAWUT\
Application Data\Microsoft\Address Book
HLM \software\microsoft\windows nt\
currentVersion
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Policies\System
HLM\System\Currentcontrolset\Services\
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run[Services]
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run[Services]Once
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run[Services]OnceEx
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT
CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify
HCR\Exefile\shell\open\command\
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start
Menu\ Programs\Startup
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Security Center
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\auto update
HLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\
WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile
HLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\
SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\
StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
HLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Explorer\
Browser Helper Objects
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this key and
subkeys
this folder and
subfolders
this key and
subkeys
this folder and
subfolders
this key only

All

this key only

set value

this key only
this key only

create subkey
set value

this key only

set value

this key only

set value

this key only

set value

this key only

set value

this key only

create subkey

this key only
this folder only

set value
write data, append
data
set value

this key and
subkeys
this key

All
All
read data
query value

set value

this key and
subkeys
this key only

set value, create
sub
set value

this key and
subkeys

create subkey

Project Lasso
The configuration file “Lasso.ini”
SkipInitDLLScan,0
LogAppliance,127.0.0.1,514
RepositoryPath,C:\Program Files\Lasso\LassoRepository\
SpoolPath,C:\Program Files\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\
EventPollInterval,10
SpoolFileSize,0.01
# spool file size in %
WatermarkWriteInterval,100
MaxTraceFileSize,1
MaxNumWorkerThreads,4
DllLoadInterval,3600
HighWaterMarks,ON
#DefaultLassoShare,LassoShare=C:\LassoTemp
CheckHostListInterval,3600
NewHostSkipHistorical,0
EnableShareDlls,1
CheckRemHostAvail,0
EnableAdminSharesIfDisabled,0
DebugLevel,31
LogLevel,7
DebugHostFileSize,10 # VICTIM#0 SIZE
AccessReport,0

The configuration file Hostlist.ini
localhost,security,system

The directory structure

Figure 26 Lasso's directory structure
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The startup process

Figure 27 Lasso's startup process

The Port Reporter
The directory structure

Figure 28 Port Reporter's directory structure
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The startup service

Figure 29 Port Reporter's startup service

System safety monitor
Application configuration
General configuration

Figure 30 System Safety Monitor's general configuration
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Logging configuration

Figure 31 System Safety Monitor's logging configuration

Applications configuration

Figure 32 System Safety Monitor's applications configuration
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Rule configuration: everything is default except “Rules>Process
control>Terminate other processes”

Figure 33 System Safety Monitor's rule configuration

The directory structure

Figure 34 System Safety Monitor's directory structure
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LogFileParsing
Command
java LogFileParsing > app.log

Task schedule

Figure 35 LogFileParsing's task schedule

Batch files
lasso.bat
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\VICTIM#0.txt
C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt

dllInjection.bat
cd C:\Program Files\System Safety Monitor\log
for /F "tokens=5 skip=5" %%A IN ('dir /O-D *.xml') DO (
copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\logs\dllInjectionLog.xml
copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\oldLog\
del /Q %%A
)

portReporter.bat
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt
copy /Y C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\pr-ports*
C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt
del /Q C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\*
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rootKitBuster.bat
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\RootkitBuster.txt
del /Q C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster\TMRBLog\*
cd C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster
RootkitBuster.exe /s /a
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster\TMRBLog\TMRB00001.TXT
C:\batchJob\logs\RootkitBuster.txt

sophosRootkit.bat
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt
cd C:\Program Files\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Rootkit
sarcli -log="C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt"

logCollector.bat
cd C:\batchJob\app
java LogFileParsing > app.log

The NW MONITOR machine
Snort (with oracle supported option)
Command
snort -de -i3 -l ..\log -h 10.0.0.0/24 -c ..\etc\snort.conf
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Configuration for Oracle supported

Figure 36 Snort's configuration for Oracle supported

The startup process

Figure 37 Snort's startup process
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Backdoor Trojan Removal
In case of detecting unknown backdoor Trojan, Snort was removed the rule
for detecting Trojans.

Switch
Switch configuration: Port monitoring

Figure 38 Switch configuration

75

Figure 39 Port monitoring page
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2. Testing steps
1. create a Trojan server on the machine ATTACKER

Figure 40 setting installation path

Figure 41 Setting autostart
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Figure 42 Setting notification

Figure 43 setting keylogger
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Figure 44 Setting process termination

2. connect to the VICTIM

Figure 45 Connecting to the VICTIM
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3. Controls the VICTIM

Figure 46 Controlling the VICTIM

Figure 47 Controlling the VICTIM
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Figure 48 Retrieving the VICTIM's processes

4. Run test.bat on the machine VICTIM
cd C:\Program Files\System Safety Monitor\log
for /F "tokens=5 skip=5" %%A IN ('dir /O-D *.xml') DO (
copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\logs\dllInjectionLog.xml
copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\oldLog\
del /Q %%A
)
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt
copy /Y C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\pr-ports*
C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt
del /Q C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\*
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt
cd C:\Program Files\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Rootkit
sarcli -proc -log="C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt"
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\VICTIM#0.txt
C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt
cd C:\batchJob\app
java LogFileParsing > app.log

81

5. run behaviorComparingEngineBatch.bat on the machine MLAS
6. runs reportGenerationEngineBatch.bat on the machine
7. Two reports generated from ReportGenerationEngine will be in the same
directory with ReportGenerationEngine
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